% This file was created with JabRef 2.6. % Encoding: Cp1252 @BOOK{tubiblio33618, title = {Nachhaltige Entwicklung. Leitbild für die Zukunft von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, publisher = {Beltz}, year = {1996}, author = {Ekaterina Atmatzidis and Siegfried Behrendt and Carsten Helm}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33618/} } @BOOK{Biermann1997, title = {Zukunftsfähige Entwicklung: Herausforderung an Wissenschaft und Politik. Festschrift für Udo E Simonis zum 60. Geburtstag}, publisher = {Edition sigma}, year = {1997}, author = {Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner and Carsten Helm}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:2:p:260-276, author = {Böhringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten}, title = {On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost}, journal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {30}, pages = {260-276}, number = {2}, abstract = {This paper introduces a solution for the fair division of emission reduction costs in the climate change regime. Our primary focus is on the fair division of efficiency gains that arise from exchanging the initial allocation of emission entitlements, rather than the initial allocation itself. We propose to complement the competitive Walrasian solution with welfare bounds, the ethical justification of which rests on commonality of ownership. Simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium model illustrate the relevance of such welfare bounds. For a wide range of initial allocations of emission entitlements - including an equal per capita allocation - we find that developing countries should be fully compensated for their emission abatement efforts, but should not receive any further transfers.}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:2:p:260-276} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:266-280, author = {Carbone, Jared C. and Helm, Carsten and Rutherford, Thomas F.}, title = {The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy}, journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, year = {2009}, volume = {58}, pages = {266-280}, number = {3}, abstract = {We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries' decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.}, keywords = { Global warming Coalitions General equilibrium Tradable permits}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:266-280} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:2:p:399-413, author = {Demougin, Dominique and Fluet, Claude and Helm, Carsten}, title = {Output and wages with inequality averse agents}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {39}, pages = {399-413}, number = {2}, abstract = {We analyse a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract that, owing to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other agent resents. We show that greater inequality aversion unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labour productivity. More specifically, inequality aversion reduces effort, wage, and payoff of agent 1. Effects on wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are substitutes or complements in the firm's output function.}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:2:p:399-413} } @MISC{RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2670, author = {Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm}, title = {Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits}, year = {2009}, abstract = { Centralization of cardiac services can increase hospital surgery volumes and decrease access for patients. This study estimates the effects of changes in the regulation of cardiac services on treatments, mortality, and utility. Demand for surgery services by heart attack victims who form expectations of the need for and productivity of surgery in their choice of hospital and treatment is estimated. The results indicate that mortality and ex ante utility are insensitive to moderate changes in policy: Changes in surgery volume and travel costs offset one another. Despite similar health outcomes, the competing policies have different implications for taxpayers. Copyright \© (2009) by the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.}, institution = {CESifo Group Munich}, number = {2670}, type = {CESifo Working Paper Series}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2670.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:463-470, author = {Demougin, Dominique and Helm, Carsten}, title = {Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power}, journal = {German Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {7}, pages = {463-470}, abstract = {We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent's outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent's bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game. Copyright Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006.}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:463-470} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33622, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Fair play im Treibhaus - Zur gerechten Verteilung von Emissionsrechten}, booktitle = {Zukunftsfähige Entwicklung. Herausforderungen an Wissenschaft und Politik}, publisher = {Edition Sigma, Berlin}, year = {1997}, editor = {Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner and Carsten Helm}, pages = {205--220}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33622/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33651, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Zur gerechten Verteilung der Lasten des Klimaschutzes - Eine ökonomische Perspektive}, booktitle = {Treibhausgasminderung in Deutschland zwischen nationalen Zielen und internationalen Verpflichtungen}, publisher = {Schriften des Forschungszentrums Jülich, Jülich}, year = {1999}, editor = {Egbert Läge, Peter Schaumann and Ulrich Fahl}, series = {14}, pages = {69--86}, abstract = {IKARUS-Workshop am 27. Mai 1998, Wissenschaftszentrum ... (Schriften des Forschungszentrums J{\"u}lich)}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33651/} } @INCOLLECTION{Helm1997, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Neue Themen für die WTO in der Globalisierung – Wettbewerbsordnung, Sozialstandards und Umweltschutzbestimmungen}, booktitle = {Jahrbuch Arbeit und Technik 1997}, publisher = {J.H.W. Dietz, Bonn}, year = {1997}, editor = {Werner Fricke and Else Fricke}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33642, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Commentary - Criteria for an Equitable Distribution of Internationally Tradeable Emission Certificates}, booktitle = {Earth System Analysis: Integrating Science for Sustainability}, publisher = {Springer, Berlin}, year = {1998}, editor = {Hans-Joachim Schellnhuber and Volker Wenzel}, pages = {337--341}, month = {Oktober}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33642/} } @INCOLLECTION{Helm2003, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Allmende, Basler Konvention, Welthandelsorganisation}, booktitle = {Öko-Lexikon}, publisher = {C.H. Beck, München}, year = {2003}, editor = {Udo E. Simonis}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33638, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Weltumweltpolitik und ökonomische Theorie}, booktitle = {Weltumweltpolitik. Grundriss und Bausteine eines neuen Politikfeldes}, publisher = {Edition Sigma, Berlin}, year = {1996}, editor = {Udo Ernst Simonis}, pages = {266--287}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33638/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33652, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {A Policy for Trade and the Environment in a Global Economy}, booktitle = {Trade and Environment - Recent Controversies - Part 1 - 3 (3 Volumes)}, publisher = {Publishing Corporation, New Dehli, India}, year = {2003}, editor = {Hans Singer and Neelambar Hatti and Rameshwar Tandon}, pages = {1039--1064}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33652/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33644, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Applying Fairness Criteria to the Allocation of Climate Protection Burdens - An Economic Perspective}, booktitle = {Fair weather? – Fairness and Equity Concerns in Climate Change}, year = {1999}, editor = {Ferenc L. Toth}, pages = {80--93}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33644/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33649, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Sustainability and New Economic Policy Options - The Example of International Emissions Trading}, booktitle = {Internationalization of the Economy and Environmental Policy Options}, publisher = {Springer, Heidelberg}, year = {2001}, editor = {Paul J.J. Welfens}, pages = {193--196}, month = {September}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33649/} } @MISC{Helmb, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Incentive Compatible Climate Contracts with Asymmetric Information}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:cup:endeec:v:13:y:2008:i:04:p:441-455_00, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {Fair division theory and climate change policy}, journal = {Environment and Development Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {13}, pages = {441-455}, number = {04}, abstract = { This paper analyzes the fair division of common property resources when monetary compensations are feasible. A prominent example is the fair division of the atmosphere's limited absorptive capacity for greenhouse gases. I propose a solution that is Pareto efficient and satisfies the axiomatic fair division criteria of individual rationality, stand-alone upper bound, and a version of envy-freeness. The latter criterion is adapted to problems where monetary compensations can be used to facilitate the fair division of the common resource. Applied to climate change, the solution implies that developing countries should participate in emission reduction efforts, but should be fully compensated for their incremental abatement costs.}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:endeec:v:13:y:2008:i:04:p:441-455_00} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:4:p:263-271, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods}, journal = {International Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {28}, pages = {263-271}, number = {4}, abstract = {This paper analyzes liability issues in the context of internationally traded goods like hazardous waste. It focuses on waste disposers of a small open economy that are judgement-proof due to either wealth constraints or regulatory liability limits. In this case, the extension of liability to waste exporters distorts the factor allocation and may reduce disposal care. Hence the optimal extension is partial at most. However, extending liability increases incentives of the waste importing country to hold domestic disposers liable. Interaction through the price system and through contracts that condition payments for disposal services on the occurrence of an accident yield identical outcomes if disposers are judgement-proof.}, keywords = { Extended liability Hazardous waste trade Externalities Moral hazard}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:4:p:263-271} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:12:p:2737-2747, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2737-2747}, number = {12}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:12:p:2737-2747} } @ARTICLE{Helm2002, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Kompensation mit Grenzen – Internationale Gerechtigkeit: Das Beispiel der Klimapolitik}, journal = {Ökologisches Wirtschaften}, year = {2002}, volume = {3/4}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:141-146, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {2001}, volume = {30}, pages = {141-146}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper analyzes a game in coalitional form that is derived from a simple economy with multilateral externalities. Following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we assume that agents react to a blocking coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. A non-empty core of this game is established by showing that the game is balanced. The proof relies only on standard convexity assumptions and, therefore, substantially generalizes the results in Chander and Tulkens (1997).}, keywords = {coalitional games}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:141-146} } @BOOK{tubiblio33617, title = {Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation}, publisher = {Edward Elgar Publishing}, year = {2001}, author = {Carsten Helm}, series = {New Horizons in Environmental Economics}, note = {Teilw. zugl.: Berlin, Humoldt-Univ., Diss., 1999}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33617/} } @ARTICLE{Helm1999, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Handel und Umwelt: Zur Frage der Kompatibilität internationaler Regime}, journal = {Swiss Political Science Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {5}, pages = {135-136}, number = {3}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:kap:enreec:v:12:y:1998:i:2:p:185-201, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty – The Case of Transboundary Acidification}, journal = {Environmental \& Resource Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {12}, pages = {185-201}, number = {2}, abstract = { The complexities of international environmental problems are only poorly understood. Hence, decision makers have to negotiate about abatement measures even though they do not know the 'true' model of the ecological system and have only a rough idea about the costs and benefits of their action. It will be analysed to what extent this kind of 'model uncertainty' – where players do not only have incomplete information about the payoff functions of the other players, but also about their own payoff function – affects the prospects of international cooperation. Using a simple game-theoretic model, it is shown how countries can use the veil of uncertainty to hide their distributional interests. The arguments are based on a deviation from the common prior assumption, which seems particularly questionable in a setting comprising various countries with different cultural and scientific backgrounds. Finally the model will prove useful to quantitatively and qualitatively illustrate the central role of model uncertainty in the negotiations of the first Sulphur Protocol signed to combat transboundary acidification. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998}, keywords = {acid rain; international negotiations; model uncertainty; transboundary pollution}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:12:y:1998:i:2:p:185-201} } @ARTICLE{Helm1997a, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Internationale Umweltabkommen und die WTO – Balanceakt zwischen Mißtrauen und Kooperation}, journal = {Ökologisches Wirtschaften}, year = {1997}, volume = {1}, pages = {23-25}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @ARTICLE{Helm1996, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Wege in eine bessere Zukunft – Mögliche Elemente einer ökologischen Reform des GATT/WTO-Regimes}, journal = {Politische Ökologie}, year = {1996}, volume = {14}, pages = {56-59}, number = {45}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @MISC{RePEc:dar:vpaper:33639, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules}, year = {1996}, abstract = {Increased environmental pollution and the globalization of economies have initiated an academic debate on the relationship between international trade and the environment. Addresses the question of whether the present GATT/WTO regime conflicts with effective policies to cope with transboundary environmental problems, including the protection of global commons. Analyses the welfare effects of transboundary pollution tariffs by using a simple partial equilibrium framework. Contrasts the results with an assessment of the existing GATT/WTO regime, in which no distinction between national and transboundary environmental problems has been made. Outlines, in conclusion, some basic elements of a necessary reform of the GATT/WTO regime. These proposals would allow border tax adjustment for certain types of production-related environmental charge without undermining an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system.}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, type = {Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:vpaper:33639} } @BOOK{Cars1995, title = {Sind Freihandel und Umweltschutz vereinbar? Ökologischer Reformbedarf des GATT/WTO-Regimes}, publisher = {edition sigma}, year = {1995}, author = {Carsten Helm}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09} } @ARTICLE{Helm1995, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Handel und Umwelt – Ökologischer Reformbedarf des GATT}, journal = {WZB-Mitteilungen}, year = {1995}, volume = {68}, pages = {22-24}, month = {Juni}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @MISC{RePEc:dar:vpaper:33637, author = {Helm, Carsten and Bruckner, Thomas and Gerhard, Petschel-Held, and Toth, Ferenc L. and Füssel, Hans Martin and Leimbach, Marian and Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim}, title = {Climate Change Decision-Support and the Tolerable Windows Approach}, year = {1999}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, type = {Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:vpaper:33637} } @MISC{RePEc:dar:vpaper:33636, author = {Helm, Carsten and Bruckner, Thomas and Toth, Ferenc}, title = {Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies}, year = {1999}, abstract = {In this paper, we critically review cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and the guard-rail approach as decision-support tools for the choice of climate protection strategies. Our main focus is on the central role of value judgments, which arise from the need to value; first, uncertain environmental benefits from climate protection relative to other goods; second, the consumption of the present relative to future generations; and third the consumption of rich relative to poor people. Each of the three approaches analyzed has its shortcomings. Cost-benefit analysis requires a complete and transitive preference ordering, which stands in sharp contrast to scientific uncertainties and valuation problems. Cost-effectiveness analysis suffers from the difficulty of setting an appropriate climate protection target. Finally, the usefulness of the guard-rail approach for decision-makers depends on the extent to which it is possible to limit the choice set.}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, type = {Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:vpaper:33636} } @CONFERENCE{Helm1999a, author = {Carsten Helm and Matthias Buck}, title = {Zehn Jahre Basler Übereinkommen: Internationaler Handel mit gefährlichen Abfällen}, year = {1999}, publisher = {Gutachten im Auftrag der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn}, note = {51 Seiten}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33646, author = {Carsten Helm and Sebastian Büttner and Frank Biermann}, title = {Elemente der Zukunftsfähigkeit - Eine Einleitung}, booktitle = {Zukunftsfähige Entwicklung. Herausforderungen an Wissenschaft und Politik}, publisher = {Edition Sigma}, year = {1997}, editor = {Frank Biermann and Sebastian Büttner and Carsten Helm}, pages = {15--28}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33646/} } @MISC{Helm, author = {Carsten Helm and Dominique Demougin}, title = {Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09} } @INCOLLECTION{Helm2001, author = {Carsten Helm and Matth}, title = {Das internationale Regime zur Kontrolle des Handels mit gefährlichen Abfällen}, booktitle = {Ökonomie als Grundlage politischer Entscheidungen}, publisher = {Leske + Budrich}, year = {2001}, editor = {Jürgen Gabriel and Michael Neugart}, pages = {323-343}, address = {Opladen}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @MISC{RePEc:dar:ddpeco:35489, author = {Helm, Carsten and Neugart, Michael}, title = {Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information}, month = May, year = {2008}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, number = {35489}, type = {Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/dar/ddpeco/35489.html} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33647, author = {Carsten Helm and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber}, title = {Wissenschaftliche Aussagen zum Klimawandel - Zum politischen Umgang}, booktitle = {Warnsignale aus der Klimaentwicklung - Wissenschaftliche Fakten}, publisher = {Parey Buchverlag, Berlin}, year = {1998}, editor = {Jose Lozan and Hartmut Grassl and Peter Hupfer}, pages = {364--367}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33647/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33641, author = {Carsten Helm and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber}, title = {Umwelt- und Handelspolitik in einer globalisierten Wirtschaft}, booktitle = {Weltumweltpolitik. Grundriss und Bausteine eines neuen Politikfeldes}, publisher = {Edition Sigma, Berlin}, year = {1996}, editor = {Udo Ernst Simonis}, pages = {219--242}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33641/} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:339-353, author = {Helm, Carsten and Schöttner, Anja}, title = {Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R\&D Spillovers}, journal = {German Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {9}, pages = {339-353}, abstract = { We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms to produce an output, for example electricity from renewable energy sources. Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal's expected cost of implementing a given expected output is always higher under the tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation. Copyright 2008 The Authors. Journal compilation Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008.}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:339-353} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33645, author = {Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis}, title = {Verteilungsgerechtigkeit in der internationalen Umweltpolitik. Theoretische Fundierung und exemplarische Formulierung}, booktitle = {Politik im 21. Jahrhundert}, publisher = {Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M.}, year = {2001}, editor = {Richard Münch and Claus Leggewie}, pages = {211--227}, month = {Oktober}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33645/} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:env:journl:ev10:ev1001, author = {Helm, Carsten and Simonis, Udo E.}, title = {Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation}, journal = {Environmental Values}, year = {2001}, volume = {10}, pages = {5-18}, number = {1}, abstract = {Proceeding on a limited number of general, widely accepted equity criteria, we develop a proposal for distributing common resources. In particular, the proposed fair division mechanism is individually rational, envy-free, Pareto-efficient and satisfies the stand alone test, which follows as a minimum requirement from the resource and population monotonicity criteria. Applied to international climate policy, the thrust of this proposal is that the South should initially be fully compensated for the greenhouse gas abatement measures it is to undertake as a result of efficiency considerations.}, keywords = {fair division; equity; common resources; climate change}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:env:journl:ev10:ev1001} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33640, author = {Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis and Frank Biermann}, title = {The Politics of the Science of Climate Change}, booktitle = {Climate of the 21st Century: Changes and Risks}, publisher = {Wissenschaftliche Auswertungen}, year = {2001}, editor = {Jose L. Lozan and Hartmut Graßl and Peter Hupfer}, pages = {364--367}, month = {Februar}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33640/} } @INCOLLECTION{tubiblio33643, author = {Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis and Fra}, title = {Weltökologie und globale Umweltpolitik}, booktitle = {Globale Trends 2004?2005 ?}, publisher = {Fischer (Tb.), Frankfurt}, year = {2003}, editor = {Ingomar Hauchler and Dirk Messner and Franz Nuscheler}, pages = {180--193}, month = {Oktober}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33643/} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:dar:vpaper:33634, author = {Helm, Carsten and Sprinz, Detlef}, title = {Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes}, journal = {The Journal of Conflict Resolution}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {630-652}, number = {5}, abstract = {Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects--but fall substantially short of the collective optima.}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, owner = {Carsten Helm}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, type = {Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:vpaper:33634} } @MISC{Helma, author = {Carsten Helm and Franz Wirl}, title = {International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.09} } @MISC{RePEc:dar:vpaper:33635, author = {Sprinz, Detlef F. and Helm, Carsten}, title = {The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept}, year = {1999}, abstract = {The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost/benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriving the various bounds, the authors discuss the determining factors and provide guidance on how such a research agenda could be pursued empirically. The authors conclude with suggestions to further refine the measurement concept and its merit for public policy.}, institution = {Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.05}, type = {Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL)}, url = {http://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:vpaper:33635} } @INCOLLECTION{1998, title = {Sind Freihandel und Umweltschutz vereinbar}, booktitle = {Ein Ordnungsrahmen für die Weltwirtschaft – nötig und möglich}, publisher = {Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn}, year = {1998}, pages = {28-33}, note = {Wirtschaftspolitische Diskurse, Nr. 119}, owner = {Norman}, timestamp = {2010.11.19} } @comment{jabref-meta: selector_publisher:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_author:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_journal:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_keywords:}