% This file was created with JabRef 2.8. % Encoding: Cp1252 @TECHREPORT{V-348-12, author = {Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm}, title = {Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits in a Globalized World}, institution = {University of Oldenburg}, year = {2012}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {V-348-12}, month = {08}, abstract = {Several European countries have reformed their labor market institutions. Incentive effects of unemployment benefits have been an important aspect of these reforms. We analyse this issue in a principal-agent model, higher level of unemployment benefits improves the workers' position in wage bargaining, leading to stronger effort incentives and higher output. However, it also reduces incentives for labor market participation. Accordingly, there is a trade-off. We analyze how changes in the economic environment such as globalization and better educated workers affect this trade-off.}, jel = {J65, D82, J41, E24}, keywords = {Unemployment benefits, incentive contracts, Nash bargaining, moral hazard, globalization}, owner = {PC}, pages = {22}, timestamp = {2012.11.25}, url = {http://www.vwl.uni-oldenburg.de/download/V-348-12.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2670, author = {Demougin, Dominique and Helm, Carsten}, title = {Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits}, institution = {CESifo Group Munich}, year = {2009}, type = {CESifo Working Paper Series}, number = {2670}, abstract = {We estimate the impacts of the Climate Change Levy (CCL) on manufacturing plants using panel data from the UK production census. Our identification strategy builds on the comparison of outcomes between plants subject to the CCL and plants that were granted an 80\% discount on the levy after joining a Climate Change Agreement (CCA). Exploiting exogenous variation in eligibility for CCA participation, we find that the CCL had a strong negative impact on energy intensity and electricity use. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the tax had no detrimental effects on economic performance and on plant exit.}, owner = {PC}, timestamp = {2012.11.25}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_2670.html} } @TECHREPORT{, author = {Helm, Carsten and Pichler, Stefan}, title = {Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading (updated version)}, institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics}, year = {2012}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {V-341-11}, month = {08}, abstract = {In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in the South, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for the North as long as it is a permit buyer; hence it chooses to subsidize TT. By contrast, the permit selling South su ers from the lower permit price and its welfare usually deteriorates, despite receiving subsidies. We also consider how TT a ects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it tends to reduce overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates.}, keywords = {emissions trading, technology transfer, international climate policy.}, owner = {PC}, timestamp = {2012.11.29}, url = {http://www.fiwi.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Helm_TechnologyGap_WP2012.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{V-341-11, author = {Helm, Carsten and Pichler, Stefan}, title = {Climate Policy with Technology Transfers and Permit Trading}, institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics}, year = {2011}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {V-341-11}, month = {11}, abstract = {In this paper, we analyze technology transfers (TT) and tradable emission rights, which are core issues of the ongoing climate negotiations. Subsidizing TT leads to the adoption of better abatement technologies in developing countries, thereby reducing the international permit price. This is bene cial for industrialized countries as long as they are permit buyers, and as long as they can target subsidies to \additional" investments. We also consider how TT a ects countries' non-cooperative choices of permit endowments and nd that it reduces overall emissions. Finally, a simple numerical simulation model illustrates some results and explores some further comparative statics.}, jel = {D62, D78, H41, O38, Q58}, keywords = {emissions trading, technology transfer, international climate policy.}, owner = {PC}, pages = {24}, timestamp = {2012.11.25}, url = {http://www.vwl.uni-oldenburg.de/download/DP_V-341_11.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{, author = {Helm, Carsten and Wirl, Franz}, title = {International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities (updated version)}, institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics}, year = {2012}, type = {Working Papers}, month = {08}, keywords = {private information, multilateral externalities, mechanism design, restricted contracts, environmental agreements}, owner = {PC}, timestamp = {2012.11.29}, url = {http://www.fiwi.uni-oldenburg.de/download/HelmWirl_Climate_short.pdf} } @TECHREPORT{V-336-11, author = {Helm, Carsten and Wirl, Franz}, title = {International Environmental Agreements: Incentive Contracts with Multilateral Externalities}, institution = {University of Oldenburg, Department of Economics}, year = {2011}, type = {Working Papers}, number = {V-336-11}, month = {06}, abstract = {We consider how one party can induce another party to join an international emission compact given private information. Due to multilateral externalities the principal uses her own emissions besides subsidies to incentivize the agent. This leads to a number of non-standard features: Optimal contracts can include a boundary part, which is not a copy of the no contract outcome. Compared to this, a contract can increase emissions of the principal for inefficient types. Subsidies can be constant or even decreasing and turn negative, i.e., the agent reduces emissions and pays the principal.}, jel = {D82, Q54, H87}, keywords = {private information, multilateral externalities, mechanism design, restricted contracts, environmental agreements}, owner = {PC}, pages = {36}, timestamp = {2012.11.25}, url = {http://www.vwl.uni-oldenburg.de/download/HelmWirlFinal_WP.pdf} }