% This file was created with JabRef 2.8. % Encoding: Cp1252 @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:resene:v:30:y:2008:i:2:p:260-276, author = {B\"{o}hringer, Christoph and Helm, Carsten}, title = {On the fair division of greenhouse gas abatement cost}, journal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {30}, pages = {260-276}, number = {2}, month = {May}, abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.}, keywords = {Asia Pacific partnership on clean development and climate; Australian climate policy; Technology t}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/resene/v30y2008i2p260-276.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:58:y:2009:i:3:p:266-280, author = {Carbone, Jared C. and Helm, Carsten and Rutherford, Thomas F.}, title = {The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy}, journal = {Journal of Environmental Economics and Management}, year = {2009}, volume = {58}, pages = {266-280}, number = {3}, month = {November}, abstract = {This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951-2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.}, keywords = {political cycles; partisan politics; electoral motives; government ideology; short-term economic}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeeman/v58y2009i3p266-280.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:cje:issued:v:39:y:2006:i:2:p:399-413, author = {Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet and Carsten Helm}, title = {Output and wages with inequality averse agents}, journal = {Canadian Journal of Economics}, year = {2006}, volume = {39}, pages = {399-413}, number = {2}, month = {May}, abstract = {This paper examines whether electoral motives and government ideology influence short-term economic performance. I employ data on annual GDP growth in 21 OECD countries over the 1951-2006 period and provide a battery of empirical tests. In countries with two-party systems GDP growth is boosted before elections and, under leftwing governments, in the first two years of a legislative period. These findings indicate that political cycles are more prevalent in two-party systems because voters can clearly punish or reward political parties for governmental performance. My findings imply that we need more elaborate theories of how government ideology and electoral motives influence short-term economic performance.}, keywords = {political cycles; partisan politics; electoral motives; government ideology; short-term economic}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cje/issued/v39y2006i2p399-413.html} } @ARTICLE{Demougin11EER, author = {Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm}, title = {Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard}, journal = {European Economic Review}, year = {2011}, volume = {55}, pages = {964 - 979}, number = {7}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:bla:germec:v:7:y:2006:i::p:463-470, author = {Dominique Demougin and Carsten Helm}, title = {Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power}, journal = {German Economic Review}, year = {2006}, volume = {7}, pages = {463-470}, month = {November}, abstract = {Corruption in the public sector erodes tax compliance and leads to higher tax evasion. Moreover, corrupt public officials abuse their public power to extort bribes from the private agents. In both types of interaction with the public sector, the private agents are bound to face uncertainty with respect to their disposable incomes. To analyse effects of this uncertainty, a stochastic dynamic growth model with the public sector is examined. It is shown that deterministic excessive red tape and corruption deteriorate the growth potential through income redistribution and public sector inefficiencies. Most importantly, it is demonstrated that the increase in corruption via higher uncertainty exerts adverse effects on capital accumulation, thus leading to lower growth rates.}, keywords = {Corruption; growth; public goods; tax evasion; uncertainty}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v7y2006ip463-470.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:cup:endeec:v:13:y:2008:i:04:p:441-455_00, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {Fair division theory and climate change policy}, journal = {Environment and Development Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {13}, pages = {441-455}, number = {04}, month = {August}, abstract = {No abstract is available for this item.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/endeec/v13y2008i04p441-455_00.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:4:p:263-271, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {How liable should an exporter be?: The case of trade in hazardous goods}, journal = {International Review of Law and Economics}, year = {2008}, volume = {28}, pages = {263-271}, number = {4}, month = {December}, abstract = {This paper demonstrates the incentives for an oligopolist to obfuscate by deliberately increasing the cost with which consumers can locate its product and price. Consumers are allowed to choose the optimal order in which to search firms and firms are able to influence this order through their choice of search costs and prices. Competition does not ensure market transparency -- equilibrium search costs are positive and asymmetric across firms. Intuitively, an obfuscating firm can soften the competition for consumers with low time costs by inducing the remaining consumers to optimally first search its rival.}, keywords = { Search costs Advertising Search order}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/irlaec/v28y2008i4p263-271.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:12:p:2737-2747, author = {Helm, Carsten}, title = {International emissions trading with endogenous allowance choices}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, year = {2003}, volume = {87}, pages = {2737-2747}, number = {12}, month = {December}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v87y2003i12p2737-2747.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:1:p:141-146, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities}, journal = {International Journal of Game Theory}, year = {2001}, volume = {30}, pages = {141-146}, number = {1}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v30y2001i1p141-146.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:kap:enreec:v:12:y:1998:i:2:p:185-201, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {International Cooperation Behind the Veil of Uncertainty -- The Case of Transboundary Acidification}, journal = {Environmental \& Resource Economics}, year = {1998}, volume = {12}, pages = {185-201}, number = {2}, month = {September}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v12y1998i2p185-201.html} } @ARTICLE{tubiblio33639, author = {Carsten Helm}, title = {Transboundary environmental problems and new trade rules}, journal = {International Journal of Social Economics}, year = {1996}, volume = {23}, pages = {29 -- 45}, number = {8}, abstract = {Increased environmental pollution and the globalization of economies have initiated an academic debate on the relationship between international trade and the environment. Addresses the question of whether the present GATT?WTO regime conflicts with effective policies to cope with transboundary environmental problems, including the protection of global commons. Analyses the welfare effects of transboundary pollution tariffs by using a simple partial equilibrium framework. Contrasts the results with an assessment of the existing GATT?WTO regime, in which no distinction between national and transboundary environmental problems has been made. Outlines, in conclusion, some basic elements of a necessary reform of the GATT?WTO regime. These proposals would allow border tax adjustment for certain types of production-related environmental charge without undermining an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33639/} } @ARTICLE{tubiblio33637, author = {Carsten Helm and Thomas Bruckner and Gerhard Petschel-Held and Ferenc L. Toth and Hans Martin F{\"u}ssel and Marian Leimbach and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber}, title = {Climate Change Decision-Support and the Tolerable Windows Approach}, journal = {Environmental Modeling and Assessment}, year = {1999}, volume = {4}, pages = {217--234}, number = {4}, note = {Reprinted in: Beth A. Simmons (2008): International Law, London: SAGE Publication.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33637/} } @ARTICLE{tubiblio33636, author = {Carsten Helm and Thomas Bruckner and Ferenc Toth}, title = {Value judgments and the choice of climate protection strategies}, journal = {International Journal of Social Economics}, year = {1999}, volume = {26}, pages = {974 -- 1021}, number = {7/8/9}, abstract = {In this paper, we critically review cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and the guard-rail approach as decision-support tools for the choice of climate protection strategies. Our main focus is on the central role of value judgments, which arise from the need to value; first, uncertain environmental benefits from climate protection relative to other goods; second, the consumption of the present relative to future generations; and third the consumption of rich relative to poor people. Each of the three approaches analyzed has its shortcomings. Cost-benefit analysis requires a complete and transitive preference ordering, which stands in sharp contrast to scientific uncertainties and valuation problems. Cost-effectiveness analysis suffers from the difficulty of setting an appropriate climate protection target. Finally, the usefulness of the guard-rail approach for decision-makers depends on the extent to which it is possible to limit the choice set.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33636/} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:bla:germec:v:9:y:2008:i::p:339-353, author = {Carsten Helm and Anja Sch\"{o}ttner}, title = {Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R\& D Spillovers}, journal = {German Economic Review}, year = {2008}, volume = {9}, pages = {339-353}, month = {08}, abstract = {Since 1980, the aggregate income of oil-exporting countries relative to that of oil- poor countries has been remarkably constant despite structural gaps in productivity growth rates. This stylized fact is analyzed in a two-country model where resource- poor (Home) and resource-rich (Foreign) economies display productivity differences but stable income shares due to terms-of-trade dynamics. We show that Home's income share is positively related to the national tax on domestic resource use, a prediction confirmed by dynamic panel estimations for sixteen oil-poor economies. National governments have incentives to deviate from both efficient and laissez-faire allocations. In Home, increasing the oil tax improves welfare through a rent-transfer mechanism. In Foreign, subsidies (taxes) on domestic oil use improve welfare if R\&D productivity is lower (higher) than in Home.}, keywords = {Endogenous Growth; Exhaustible Resources; International Trade}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/germec/v9y2008ip339-353.html} } @ARTICLE{RePEc:env:journl:ev10:ev1001, author = {Carsten Helm and Udo E. Simonis}, title = {Distributive Justice in International Environmental Policy: Axiomatic Foundation and Exemplary Formulation}, journal = {Environmental Values}, year = {2001}, volume = {10}, pages = {5-18}, number = {1}, month = {February}, abstract = {In the wake of the Great Depression, the Canadian government embarked on a stunning reversal in its commercial policy. A key element of its response was the promotion of intra-imperial trade at the Imperial Economic Conference of 1932. This paper addresses whether or not Canadian trade was able to defy gravity and divert trade flows towards other signatories at Ottawa. The results strongly suggest that the conference was a failure from the Canadian perspective. Potential sources of this failure include unreasonable expectations about the likely reductions in trade costs and a neglect of key considerations related to certainty and credibility.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://ideas.repec.org/a/env/journl/ev10ev1001.html} } @ARTICLE{tubiblio33634, author = {Carsten Helm and Detlef Sprinz}, title = {Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes}, journal = {Journal of Conflict Resolution}, year = {2000}, volume = {44}, pages = {630--652}, number = {5}, month = {Oktober}, abstract = {Although past research has emphasized the importance of international regimes for international governance, systematic assessments of regime effects are missing. This article derives a standardized measurement concept for the effectiveness of international environmental regimes. It is based on a simultaneous evaluation of actual policy against a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum. Subsequently, the empirical feasibility of the measurement concept is demonstrated by way of two international treaties regulating transboundary air pollution in Europe. The results demonstrate that the regimes indeed show positive effects--but fall substantially short of the collective optima.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33634/} } @ARTICLE{tubiblio33635, author = {Detlef F. Sprinz and Carsten Helm}, title = {The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement Concept}, journal = {International Political Science Review? Revue internationale de science pol}, year = {1999}, volume = {20}, pages = {359--369}, number = {4}, month = {Oktober}, abstract = {The article outlines a method to measure the effect which international regimes have on solving global environmental problems such as global climate change. By using political-economic cost?benefit analysis, a no-regime counterfactual and a collective optimum (lower and upper bounds) are derived. By comparing the actual performance of a regime to these bounds, a simple coefficient of regime effectiveness can be computed. After theoretically deriving the various bounds, the authors discuss the determining factors and provide guidance on how such a research agenda could be pursued empirically. The authors conclude with suggestions to further refine the measurement concept and its merit for public policy.}, owner = {elit}, timestamp = {2012.01.23}, url = {http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/33635/} }